The 13th Annual CEND symposium:
Rapid innovation in a highly regulated space -
What can we learn from COVID-19 for
pandemic preparedness?
4-5 May 2021
Hosted by the Henry Wheeler Center for Emerging and Neglected Diseases
Two Day Conference
This year the Henry Wheeler Center for Emerging and Neglected Diseases will provide a forum for interdisciplinary, science-based discussion to collate “lessons learned” and develop recommendations for future pandemic preparedness. Our schedule includes lectures and interactive workshops.
Featured Speakers:
Janet Napolitano
Professor of Public Policy at the Goldman School of Public Policy, UC Berkeley
How safe are we really? Disaster
preparedness after Covid-19
Harold Varmus
Professor of Medicine, Weill Cornell Medicine
What urban centers can contribute to pandemic preparedness
Mark McClellan
Professor of Business, Medicine, and Policy, and founding Director of the Duke-Margolis Center for Health Policy, Duke University
National Dialogue for Healthcare Innovation: Framework for Private-Public Collaboration on Disaster Preparedness and Response
CEND's Mission
May 4th - Lectures
Jonna Mazet
UC Davis One Health Institute
Using a One Health approach to chart a path out of the Pandemic Era
Eva Harris
UC Berkeley Center for Global Public Health
Large-scale serology studies
Lisa Barcellos
UC Berkeley Center for Computational Biology
Large-scale serology studies
UC Berkeley Center for Emerging and Neglected Diseases
RapidFire: Academic discovery of novel Covid-19 therapeutics
UC Berkeley Department of Toxicology and Nutrition Sciences
RapidFire: Academic discovery of novel Covid-19 therapeutics
UCSF Department of Pharmaceutical Chemistry
RapidFire: Academic discovery of novel Covid-19 therapeutics
UC Berkeley Department of Chemistry
RapidFire: Academic discovery of novel Covid-19 therapeutics
Laboratory Director, National Public Health and Diagnostic Services, Kampala Uganda, Research scientist, Infectious Diseases Research Collaboration
No one is safe until everyone is safe - Development of Covid-19 testing capacity in Uganda
May 5th - Workshops:
WORKSHOP 1: Regulatory Science and Pandemic Preparedness – towards “crisis standards of care”
In Emergency Medicine, "crisis standards of care" are well established: Doctors train ahead of time for and have protocols in place how to triage patients in case disaster strikes, ERs are overrun and providers have to quickly decide which heavily injured patient to treat first. However, for other critical elements of pandemic response, i.e. diagnostic testing, manufacturing and supply chain, no such "crisis standards of care" exist. Instead, sometimes overly cautious restrictions are in place that can severely hamper the development of testing capacity during sudden need, i.e. during a pandemic. There is no provision for a sudden increase in need for capacity, breakdown of international supply chains, or a shortage of licensed providers to order and conduct tests and communicate results. How can we use our experience with COVID-19 to inform the generation of a "crisis standard of care" for the regulatory system?
WORKSHOP 2: How to refocus research to a new threat rapidly – effective funding mechanisms and science administration to harness reserve capacity
Harnessing National research capacity and allowing investigators to study a new pathogen is a key element of finding a solution to treat and prevent disease and we have seen an unprecedented effort in the science community, including some private sector and grassroots initiatives. However, the long timelines and risk averse nature of government funding, together with the difficulty to access critical reagents and clinical samples, have slowed down the pivot to COVID-19 research. Also locally, university lab closures and administrative/compliance issues have exacerbated the problem of conducting critical COVID-19 research in a timely fashion. How can we develop systems that allow for a rapid reorientation of research effort in a situation of National need?
WORKSHOP 3: How to accelerate therapeutics development and develop sufficient high containment Drug Discovery laboratory capacity (BSL3/4)
Airborne pathogens, which are the most likely to lead to pandemic spread, require BSL3 or BSL4 containment for research work. BSL3 and BSL4 capacity, both in terms of space and trained personnel, is severely limited, largely confined to academic and government institutions, and cannot support large-scale research and Drug Discovery. In particular, few laboratories can conduct automated high throughput screening in a BSL3 environment. This capacity is very difficult to increase in a timely manner. How can we generate the necessary infrastructure for pandemic preparedness?