WORKSHOP 1:  Regulatory Science and Pandemic Preparedness – towards “crisis standards of care”

In Emergency Medicine, "crisis standards of care" are well established: Doctors train ahead of time for and have protocols in place how to triage patients in case disaster strikes, ERs are overrun and providers have to quickly decide which heavily injured patient to treat first. However, for other critical elements of pandemic response, i.e. diagnostic testing, manufacturing and supply chain, no such "crisis standards of care" exist. Instead, sometimes overly cautious restrictions are in place that can severely hamper the development of testing capacity during sudden need, i.e. during a pandemic. There is no provision for a sudden increase in need for capacity, breakdown of international supply chains, or a shortage of licensed providers to order and conduct tests and communicate results. How can we use our experience with COVID-19 to inform the generation of a "crisis standard of care" for the regulatory system?   

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WORKSHOP 2:  How to refocus research to a new threat rapidly – effective funding mechanisms and science administration to harness reserve capacity

Harnessing National research capacity and allowing investigators to study a new pathogen is a key element of finding a solution to treat and prevent disease and we have seen an unprecedented effort in the science community, including some private sector and grassroots initiatives.  However, the long timelines and risk averse nature of government funding, together with the difficulty to access critical reagents and clinical samples, have slowed down the pivot to COVID-19 research. Also locally, university lab closures and administrative/compliance issues have exacerbated the problem of conducting critical COVID-19 research in a timely fashion. How can we develop systems that allow for a rapid reorientation of research effort in a situation of National need?

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WORKSHOP 3: How to accelerate therapeutics development and develop sufficient high containment Drug Discovery laboratory capacity (BSL3/4)

Airborne pathogens, which are the most likely to lead to pandemic spread, require BSL3 or BSL4 containment for research work. BSL3 and BSL4 capacity, both in terms of space and trained personnel, is severely limited, largely confined to academic and government institutions, and cannot support large-scale research and Drug Discovery. In particular, few laboratories can conduct automated high throughput screening in a BSL3 environment. This capacity is very difficult to increase in a timely manner. How can we generate the necessary infrastructure for pandemic preparedness?

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